We investigate how Germany's mandated 50% labor representation on supervisory boards affects layoffs and wage cuts during industry shocks. We hypothesize that parity codetermination helps the implementation of implicit contracts that insure employees against adverse shocks. We estimate difference-in-differences in employment and wages using panel data at the establishment level. The results show white-collar and skilled blue-collar workers employed by firms with parity codetermination are protected against layoffs and wage cuts during shock periods. Moreover, white-collar workers and skilled blue-collar workers pay an insurance premium of about 3% in the form of lower wages. In contrast, we find no evidence of insurance for unskilled blue-collar workers; they are neither protected against industry shocks, nor do they pay an insurance premium in the form of lower wages.
Introduction
Worker participation in corporate governance varies across countries. While employees are rarely represented on corporate boards in most countries, Botero et al. (2004) state "workers, or unions, or both have a right to appoint members to the Board of Directors" (page 1349) in Austria, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Germany, Norway, Slovenia, and Sweden. Such board representation gives labor a means to influence corporate policy regarding employee welfare, which may affect productivity and how the economic pie is shared between shareholders and employees. This paper focuses on risk-sharing between workers and the firm: Risk-neutral principals of the firm provide implicit insurance to risk-averse employees against layoffs and wage cuts during adverse shocks.
Employees, in turn, pay an insurance premium in the form of lower wages (Baily, 1974; Azariadis, 1975;  and Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi, 2005) . We argue firms and employees are likely to commit to such implicit insurance contracts when employees have a means to monitor and enforce its implementation.
We hypothesize labor representation on corporate boards provides an ex-post enforcement mechanism to ensure contracts will be honored when employees need protection.
To test this hypothesis, we examine the German system, which requires 50% employee representation on supervisory boards -hereafter referred as parity codetermination -when firms have more than 2,000 employees working in Germany. We choose the German case because it offers an ideal laboratory, in which companies that are similar on many dimensions nonetheless have different degrees of labor representation. For Germany we can also obtain detailed, high quality panel data from the Institute of Employment Research (IAB), which compiles data on employment and wages for all establishments located in Germany over our sample period 1990 to 2008.
Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find white-collar and skilled blue-collar workers of parity-codetermined firms are protected against layoffs and wage cuts when other firms in the same industry substantially reduce employment. In contrast, unskilled blue-collar workers are not protected from layoffs during industry shocks. The protection for white-collar and skilled blue-collar workers does not necessarily imply the implementation of the implicit insurance contract. It may be due to greater worker influence arising from their representation on boards. If it is the influence, rather than insurance, that prevents layoffs and wage cuts during adverse shocks, there is no reason to expect employees to pay an insurance premium in the form of lower wages. The data supports the insurance hypothesis for workers with vocational and higher educational qualifications, two categories that cover most skilled blue-collar and white-collar workers. These groups of workers receive lower wages during normal times in return for employment insurance. By contrast, workers without educational qualifications do not receive significantly lower wages. The insurance hypothesis does not seem to apply to employees with lower qualifications.
Providing insurance only to more educated and highly skilled employees may be efficient for firms with mandatory parity codetermination because the insurance encourages investment in firm-specific human capital. Such investments enhance productivity more if done by workers with more human capital (education) and higher level of skills. Unskilled workers with lower skill levels and less education have less human capital to invest for firm-specific purposes and are easier to replace.
The lack of protection for unskilled blue-collar workers may also be explained by the composition of labor representatives on the supervisory boards. The election process for worker representatives reserves some seats for union representatives and representatives of middle management and may favor skilled blue-collar and white-collar workers, so that employees with low qualifications may not have true representation on the boards championing their cause. Without an effective ex-post mechanism to enforce the contract, unskilled workers will neither pay for the insurance in the form of lower wages nor be protected against industry shocks.
To the extent firms with parity codetermination provide protection to their white-collar and skilled blue-collar workers against adverse shocks, their operating leverage will be higher. We find these firms are more vulnerable to industry shocks; their profitability and firm valuation take greater hits, and their stock price beta increases more during shock periods than firms without parity codetermination. We also find parity-codetermined firms do more major asset sales during shock periods, presumably to finance the maintenance of payroll.
Finally, we attempt to address the controversy over whether mandated parity codetermination is efficient. Jensen and Meckling (1979) argue that firms rarely voluntarily invite worker representation on the board; hence, mandatory codetermination must be inefficient because worker decision rights may guide the firm towards value decreasing policies. The argument is even more salient in the German context, because it would be easy for shareholders to voluntarily nominate additional worker representatives to boards; particularly firms where one third of the directors are worker representatives already should therefore voluntarily move to parity codetermination. Levine and Tyson (1990) provide a counter-argument: The competition for workers between firms creates externalities and a mandatory worker representation will remove this externality. They argue firms would benefit if they all introduced labor representation, providing workers with stronger incentives to enhance productivity. However, such firms would also have compressed wage structures. In smoothly functioning labor markets, firms with labor participation will lose their star performers to firms without labor participation; thus, the equilibrium with labor participation will unravel and only an inferior equilibrium without labor participation will prevail. These arguments provide a testable prediction; firms with mandatory codetermination will have more compressed wage structures. Furthermore, if investors capture some of the surplus associated with higher productivity, parity-codetermined firms will be more profitable and valued higher. We do not find support for either prediction. There is no significant evidence that firms with parity codetermination have more compressed wage structures or higher valuations.
The hypothesis that firms insure workers against shocks goes back at least to the implicit contracting models of Baily (1974) and Azariadis (1975) . More recently, Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi (2005) investigate a matched employee-firm panel of Italian firms and show that firms have a significant role for protecting workers against shocks. We add to these contributions by relating the insurance hypothesis to worker participation in governance. In so far as German firms are concerned, insurance is not automatic.
The insurance effects are most prevalent when workers have a sufficient representation on the board.
Even with such representation, not all workers are covered by this insurance mechanism. Only workers with higher educational qualifications seem to be covered by the insurance to encourage investment in firm-specific human capital.
A large literature investigates the implications of German codetermination for profitability and valuation. Renaud (2007) surveys 13 studies investigating the impact of codetermination on company performance using different methodological approaches, sample constructions, and performance variables. 1 We perform similar analyses and separate the effect of economic shocks from the overall effect of parity codetermination through the cycle for Tobin's Q and the return on assets. The throughthe-cycle effects are statistically never significant and we conclude that shareholders do not participate in any of the benefits that may be generated from parity codetermination. Nonetheless, our main contribution to the literature on codetermination is to show how labor representation affects risk sharing and firm policies in restructuring situations.
Our contribution is also relevant to the literature on employment protection; Addison and Teixeira (2003) survey that literature, which mostly follows the lead of Lazear (1990) and is concerned with the protection of workers through instruments such as severance pay and notice periods, and the impact this has on employment and unemployment. A later strand of that literature builds on the approach of Botero et.al. (2004) , who construct an index of employment rigidity and seeks to understand the political economy of labor market regulations. All these cross-country studies are firm-level or country-level studies and are concerned with different questions. By contrast, ours is a microeconomic study that 1 A more recent study by Petry (2009) finds a negative effect of codetermination using event-study methodology.
focuses on how the allocation of ownership rights through board representation may implement a mechanism to transfer human-capital risk from workers to firms. 2
Theoretical considerations and hypothesis development
The insurance hypothesis. Our hypotheses rely on two distinct but related versions of the insurance argument; the first emphasizes efficient risk-sharing, whereas the second version focuses on the protection of workers' investments in firm-specific human capital. According to the efficient risk-sharing argument, diversified, risk-neutral investors insure risk-averse workers against firm-level shocks.
Workers give up a portion of their wages in return for protection against adverse shocks. 3 This shifts human-capital risk from workers to investors. Workers who give up a portion of their wages have to count on firms' honoring their side of bargain in the event of adverse shocks.
When employees can count on long-term employment with the firm, they are more likely to invest in firm-specific human capital. Relationship-specific investments require ex ante incentives as well as ex post protection through decision-making rights. Hence, according to this argument, workers should have such rights and be entitled to a share in the firm's surplus when they make investments in firm-specific human capital. 4 Such investments can be narrowly defined as acquiring firm-specific skills and knowledge. However, Alesina et. al. (2010) provide a broader perspective on workers' firm-specific investments, arguing that workers suffer utility losses when layoffs force them to give up family relationships. Workers' choice of a domicile close to a firm may thus be regarded as a firm-specific investment. The authors then provide evidence on the relation between labor laws and the strength of The only exception we are aware of is Lafontaine and Sivadasan (2009) , who use establishment-level data in a cross-country setting by studying all establishments of one multi-national firm. They focus on how quickly their firm adjusts employment in different countries. 3 Papers that formalize aspects of this argument are Baily (1974), Harris and Holmstrom (1982), Holmstrom (1983) , Gamber (1988) , and Thomas and Worrall (1988) . 4 The general argument about the correspondence between firm-specific investments and the ex post protection of rents goes back at least to Alchian (1984) . Fama and Jensen (1983) refer to the human capital investments of professionals in service firms and deduce that they should accordingly hold residual claims. Pagano and Volpin (2008) refer to this argument, but reference only the general incomplete contracting literature. family ties in a cross-country study, supporting the view that the legal protection of employment safeguards workers' firm-specific investments.
Both the efficient risk-sharing and the firm-specific investment arguments suggest a role for labor representation in allowing firms to enter long-term commitments with their employees. Both arguments imply that workers are vulnerable to breaches of implicit contracts by the firm. Workers make wage concessions or investments in firm-specific human capital well before the firm has to honor its side of the bargain, i.e., refrain from layoffs and cutting wages when it suffers adverse shocks. From this perspective, parity codetermination serves as an ex-post enforcement device that ensures firms will honor their commitment to long-term employment contracts.
Hypothesis 1: Parity codetermination is an ex-post enforcement device that ensures workers receive full protection against adverse shocks to employment and wages.
Providing insurance is costly to firms. Guaranteeing employment against adverse shocks limits firms' ability to reduce payroll in reaction to changes in technology or consumer taste. This increases the fixed components of payroll and thereby increases operating leverage.
Hypothesis 2:
Parity-codetermined firms suffer larger reductions in profitability and valuation from adverse industry shocks than firms without parity codetermination.
To cover the costs of the protection, parity-codetermined firms will offer lower wages. Workers have a choice; pay the insurance premium or work elsewhere. More risk averse individuals will accept lower wages, while less risk averse individuals will choose workplaces that do not require the insurance premium.
Hypothesis 3: Firms with parity codetermination pay on average lower wages than nonparity firms.
Is the mandated codetermination efficient? If labor representation increases the surplus from production because it enhances worker incentives, then firms should voluntarily invite workers to the board of directors. However, worker representatives may use their influence not only to protect implicit contracts, but also to prevent restructuring measures necessary for revitalization of the company (Atanassov and Kim, 2009 ). Moreover, Jensen and Meckling (1979) point out that firms almost never provide workers with decision-making rights voluntarily and conclude that labor representation on the board is inefficient and mandating it is likely to be harmful. 5 Levine and Tyson (1990) argue that the competition for workers between firms creates externalities and suggest mandatory worker representation as a means to remove this externality. They argue that firms are caught in a prisoners' dilemma. All firms would collectively benefit if they introduced labor representation, which would provide workers with stronger incentives to enhance productivity. 6 However, such firms would also have compressed wage structures and would not provide adequate incentives through the threat of dismissals. 7 In smoothly functioning labor markets without mandatory labor representation, firms with labor representation will lose their most efficient workers to firms without labor representation; hence, the equilibrium with labor representation will unravel and only an inferior equilibrium without labor representation will prevail. 8 Accordingly, codetermination has to be mandated to overcome these externalities. Since not all German firms are required to have parity codetermination, the pro-regulation argument predicts: 5 Furubotn (1988) distinguishes between the European model, in which codetermination is legally mandated, and the "joint investment model," where shareholders and workers agree on codetermination as an efficient governance mechanism. 6 Levine and Tyson (1990) review the large empirical evidence for the productivity benefits of worker participation. Fauver and Fuerst (2006) list more advantages of labor representation, such as reduced frictions and fewer strikes. Kim and Ouimet (2013) show employee stock ownership plans that provide both cash flow and voting rights enhance productivity, benefiting both workers and shareholders. 7 Levine and Tyson (1990) provide three reasons why pay would be egalitarian in firms that enhance productivity through worker participation: (1) egalitarian pay is conducive to an atmosphere of trust; (2) bonuses for group work provide better incentives for cooperation than competition in "bonus tournaments";
(3) if worker participation in wage-setting extends to compensation, there will be "pressure to reduce highend wages." (p. 212). 8 There is a broader literature that identifies frictions in labor markets to support long-term contracts. Baily (1974) already contains a formal model of such a friction. In a recent theoretical analysis, Acharya, Pagano, and Volpin (2010) show how different levels of frictions in the managerial labor market may enhance or undermine long-term contracts between firms and managers in which firms provide insurance to managers.
Hypothesis 4: Firms with parity codetermination have more compressed wage structures; namely, a narrower gap between top and bottom wage earners.
Worker protection and managerial entrenchment. One may counter the pro-regulation argument by pointing out inefficiencies stemming from worker participation in governance. Pagano and Volpin (2005) develop a model in which management grants control rights to workers and pay above-market wages to garner their support in thwarting hostile takeover bids. Atanassov and Kim (2009) These worker-management entrenchment hypotheses provide a negative prediction on firm performance. Moreover, if workers enjoy protection against adverse shocks through entrenchment, they are unlikely to offer wage concessions and firms incur the costs of employment protection and suffer the ensuing inefficiencies without any matching benefits.
Hence, we obtain a negative prediction on the relationship between mandatory labor representation from the entrenchment hypothesis, but a positive prediction from the insurance hypothesis and the prisoners'-dilemma argument of Levine and Tyson (1990) . We therefore do not formulate a formal hypothesis and the relationship between worker representation and firm profitability or firm value is ultimately an empirical question. The empirical results in the studies surveyed by Renaud (2007) are inconclusive.
3 Institutional background, data, and empirical design
Institutional background
Germany has a two-tier board system, where the management board (Vorstand) manages day-to-day operations and the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) supervises the management board and appoints its members, including the CEO. The structure of the board is regulated by the German stock corporation act (Aktiengesetz) and the codetermination act (Mitbestimmungsgesetz) as well as other laws. The two boards are strictly separated and no member of one board can be a member of the other board for the same company at the same time. Direct board interlocks are also prohibited, so it is not possible for a supervisory board member of company A to also sit on the management board of company B if a member of the supervisory board of company B is already on the management board of company A.
Individuals are not allowed to accumulate more than ten seats on the supervisory boards of different corporations. For this regulation, a chairmanship counts as two board seats.
The size and composition of the supervisory board is mandated by law and there is a minimum and a maximum number of seats dependent on the number of employees of the firm and the equity capital.
The German stock corporation act (Aktiengesetz) requires that half of the supervisory board members are worker representatives for firms with more than 2,000 employees working in Germany. For firms with more than 500 up to 2,000 employees in Germany, one third of the members of the supervisory board have to represent workers. Worker representatives are elected by the company's workers.
Depending on the size of the supervisory board, two or three seats of the worker representatives are reserved for union representatives; one seat is always reserved for a representative from middle management (leitende Angestellte). The annual general shareholders' meeting elects the shareholder representatives on the supervisory board. All board members have one vote each in electing the chairman and the vice chairman of the board. If no member of the board receives two thirds of the votes, the chairman is elected only by the shareholder representatives and the vice chairman by the employee representatives. The chairman of the board has the casting vote in case of a tie.
Wages in most German firms are set through collective bargaining agreements between trade unions and employers' associations. 9 Unions used to specialize in broadly-defined industries (e.g., metal, mining, banking, etc.), but several of these unions merged during our sample period. The wage contracts between unions and employers' associations are only binding on their respective members, but are generally extended to non-unionized workers. Firms not covered by binding wage agreements sometimes adopt unionized wage agreements or negotiate firm-level agreements with the unions in their firm. During our sample period it became more common for collective wage agreements to include opt-out clauses that allow firms not to apply the agreement in some circumstances, generally tied to poor business prospects of the firm. Then the workers of the firm may offer wage concessions to the firm to preserve their jobs.
Data
The sample firms are drawn from all companies included in the two main German stock market indices, DAX and MDAX, at any point over the 19-year period from 1990 to 2008. 10 There are 184 such firms, for which we hand collect data on the composition of the supervisory board from annual reports and the Bundesagentur für Arbeit (BA). The BA collects worker and employer contributions to unemployment insurance and distributes unemployment benefits. All German businesses are required to report detailed information on employment and wages to the BA. This data is made anonymous and offered for scientific use by the IAB. An establishment is any facility reported by a company as having a separate physical address, such as a factory, service station, restaurant, and so on. The IAB provides detailed establishment level data on industry, location, employment, employee education, age, nationality, and wages.
The IAB reports different industry classifications; unfortunately, none is reported for the entire sample period. We use the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE), a six-digit industry classification. The first four levels are the same for all European countries. The IAB database contains different versions of the NACE classification. We use NACE Revision 1.1, which is based on the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC Rev. 3) of the United Nations. 11 In our analysis we define an industry based on the first three-digits of the NACE code, which identifies 224 separate economic sub-sectors (groups). The NACE (Rev. 1.1) is available from the IAB database only for 2003 and afterwards. For establishments that exist prior to 2003, we assign the available NACE (Rev. 1.1) classification. This procedure is valid because if an establishment changes its industry classification, it receives a new establishment ID. There are 43,874 establishments changing industry classifications over time. 12 We drop these establishments to avoid the chance of assigning them to incorrect industry codes.
We also drop establishment-year observations with missing information on industry classification. These screens yield approximately 33.4 million establishment-year observations on approximately 3.5 million establishments for the sample period 1990 through 2008.
11
NACE is similar to NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), which is also based on ISIC. 12 In a separate robustness check, we also translate industry classifications reported in the earlier sample years into NACE (Rev. 1.1) and obtain very similar results (unreported). At our request, the IAB matched our sample of listed firms with their establishment-level database using an automatic procedure; matching was based on company name and address information (city, zip code, street, and house number). Additionally, we provide the IAB with names of major subsidiaries The matching procedure also does not allow us to analyze restructuring decisions, which involve the divestment or closure of establishments. However, it is not clear why parity firms should take these actions more often than non-parity firms because employees are probably more adversely affected in those cases. Table   2 is based on all establishments in our sample, while Panel B shows statistics at the firm level. All accounting and market variables are taken from Worldscope and Datastream, as they are available only at the firm level, not at the establishment level. The IAB does not provide information on any of the firm level variables in Panel B. Establishment years for IAB data are from July to June, whereas fiscal years of German firms are mostly from January to December. We therefore lag all variables from Worldscope by six months relative to IAB years. Effectively, we assign year-end values from Worldscope to June 30 of the same year. The IAB distinguishes employees in different categories depending on their occupational status. The three most important groups are unskilled blue-collar workers, skilled blue-collar workers, and whitecollar employees. Other groups are employees in vocational training, home workers, master craftsmen, and part-time employees. We do not analyze these groups of employees because they usually form only a small fraction of employees and are present in relatively few establishments. The IAB also reports three different qualification levels at each establishment by educational and vocational qualifications: (1) (3) Highly qualified employees have a degree from a specialized college of higher education or a university degree. The German education system is considerably different from most other developed countries. Only a relatively small fraction of students obtains an upper secondary school degree (high school, Abitur), which allow them to enter a college or university. This fraction rose from 31% in 1992 to 45% in 2008.
IAB classifies all employees who obtained a college or university degree as highly qualified. The typical career path in Germany is to leave school after tenth grade and to enter vocational training. In 2009, 57.8% of the German population had such a vocational qualification and IAB classifies these as qualified employees. In 2009, 27.8% of the German population had none of these qualifications. All employees who have neither an upper secondary school degree nor a vocational qualification are classified as lowqualified employees.
Unfortunately, over our sample period an increasing number of firms stopped reporting these qualifications, either stating the qualification is unknown or not responding to the question. This trend leads to a steady increase in the number of employees with unknown qualifications. Because of this shortcoming, our employment regressions do not use the breakdown of employees according to educational and vocational qualifications; instead, we use only the classification by occupational status into unskilled blue-collar workers, skilled blue-collar workers, and white-collar employees. However, our wage analyses rely on the breakdown by educational and vocational qualifications because IAB does not report wage distributions according to occupational status. We use the median daily wages of the three different qualification levels. If firms' decision not to report their employees' qualification is random, the increasing trend in the number of employees with unknown qualifications should not bias our results.
Research design
We hypothesize that labor representation in governance is an ex-post enforcement mechanism to ensure the implicit insurance benefits will be honored. The insurance will soften or even remove the impact of an adverse shock that would otherwise require sacrifices from employees. Our empirical strategy is to compare how a negative shock affects employee layoffs and wage cuts of firms with parity codetermination differently from those with one-third or no labor representation on the supervisory board. This comparison requires a difference-in-differences approach.
The main independent variable is the dummy variable Parity, which is one in any firm-year when a firm is required to have 50% worker representation on the supervisory board, and zero otherwise. We shall refer to firms with parity codetermination as parity firms and to all others, including those requiring one-third representation, as non-parity firms. Following Gorton and Schmid (2004) , we do not distinguish between firms with one-third and no worker representation. This helps preserve the sample size of nonparity firms, which is smaller than that of parity firms. Table 2 , Panel B shows 67.4% of our sample firms are parity firms. We focus on whether a firm is has parity codetermination or not, because the fierce debate over the codetermination laws at the time of its passage in 1976 illustrates that parity codetermination was much more controversial and of a major concern to shareholders and managers than one-third representation. 13
13
The Bundestag, the lower house of the German parliament, passed the codetermination act on March 18, 1976 with only 22 votes against. However, several large corporations and the association of employers were dissatisfied and challenged the law in the German constitutional court, which decided in favor of the law in
Definition of shocks
A key in any difference-in-differences approach is the identification of an exogenous intervention. We identify exogenous shocks to employment in firms that are not in our sample. Using these external shocks, we analyze how parity and non-parity firms in our sample respond differently to shocks. We define shocks at the industry level. We count the number of employees in all establishments located in
Germany. An industry is subject to a shock if establishments not belonging to our sample firms but belonging to the same 3-digit NACE-code industry as a whole suffer a decrease of at least 5% in employment. These establishments may belong to either German or foreign firms. When other firms in the same industry reduce the number of workers employed, our sample firms are also likely to be under economic pressure to decrease their payroll. Our test is whether the responses by parity firms differ from those of non-parity firms. We use the 5% threshold to ensure that shocks are strong enough to have a material effect and frequent enough to permit identification.
These shocks are based on non-sample firms with establishments located in Germany. We do not use non-German European firms with establishments located outside of Germany, because Germany seems to follow a different business cycle from other EU countries. For example, at the time of working on this project, 2011-2012, the German economy is booming while most other European countries are in, or at the verge of, a recession. A potential concern with using non-sample firms to define shocks may be that they are too small in comparison to our sample firms. However, the non-sample firms used to define shocks include many large non-listed, family owned, or foreign firms with establishments located in Germany, e.g., Bosch, Aldi, Boehringer Ingelheim, Edeka, Rewe Group, Haniel, Shell Germany, BP Germany, Ford, Coca Cola, Procter & Gamble, Dow Chemical, Pfizer, IBM, Hewlett-Packard, ExxonMobil, Vodafone, Gazprom Germania, Sanofi-Aventis Germany, Telefónica Germany, and Fujitsu. Furthermore, the mean (median) total sales and the number of employees of the largest 100 non-sample firms used to 1979. After the ruling the debate subsided. See also Petry (2009) . Two of the performance studies cited by Renaud (2007) also use the presence or absence of parity codetermination as their main classification. identify shocks are €10.2 bn (€7.0 bn) and 33,500 (19,700) in 2006, respectively. These numbers are not that far off from the corresponding numbers for our sample firms in 2006, which are €11.7 bn (€2.0 bn) and 38,700 (9,200), respectively.
We require that a shock is persistent; namely, employment growth in an industry is not positive in the year following the initial shock. Pagano and Pica (2010) distinguish between cash flow shocks and shocks to productivity. Shocks to cash flows may have no implications for future profitability (e.g., a negative cash flow due to a large investment) and, therefore, may not affect current employment levels.
By contrast, shocks to productivity may pose persistent shocks to investment opportunities and require adjustments to employment. Our test requires shocks that are likely to lead to a reduction in payroll.
Since a shock to productivity is not directly observable, we use persistent shocks to non-sample firms' employment and argue that these shocks may also affect the optimal payroll of our sample firms. We do not include transitory shocks to employment, because they may reflect temporary fluctuations in demand for products and services, with no direct impact on our sample firms' optimal payroll. 14 A dummy variable Shock is defined, which equals one in any given year when an industry was subject to a persistent shock. We illustrate how Shock is defined with Table 3 , which shows four possible sequences of employment growth over five years.
Four-year interval (baseline):
A shock period is defined such that a decrease of 5% or more in employment triggers a shock period if the following year also shows a non-positive change in employment. If growth is positive in the subsequent year, then the shock is regarded as transitory and Shock = 0, even in the year where employment declines by more than 5%. A shock period is defined over four years. A shock period ends after four consecutive years of non-positive growth or after a resumption of positive growth, whichever occurs first. Shock = 1 for the first year of a shock period and for up to three subsequent years as long as there is no recovery. Hence, Table 3 shows 14 The econometric technique of Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi (2005) uses time series analysis to decompose shocks into a permanent component and a temporary component. Shock = 1 for years 1 and 2, and also for year 3 in case A, because there is no recovery in year 3; no shock years in B, because there is positive employment growth in year 2; and Shock = 1 for years 1, 2, 3, and 4 in cases C and D.
Two-year interval (robustness): As a robustness check, we define shocks over a two-year interval. As before, a decrease of 5% or more in employment may trigger a shock period, if the following year also shows a non-positive change in employment. After that, the shock ends. Hence, Table 3 shows Shock = 1 for years 1 and 2 in case A; there are no shock years in B as before; Shock = 1 for years 1 and 2 in case C, but not for year 4 because the decline of 2% is not large enough to define a new shock; and Shock = 1 for years 1, 2, 4, and 5 in case D because employment growth in period 4 is -5%, which initiates a new shock. 15 It would make no difference even if year 3 had a negative growth, say -1%, because the shock period is over after 2 years. economic downturns in German industry following the post-unification boom in the early 1990s (1990) (1991) (1992) and with the recession after the burst of the internet bubble in 2000-2001. 16 The shock-periods appear longer because of the lag built into the definition of shocks. The R²s of these regressions are only around 8%, indicating that much of the variation in shocks is industry-specific and not driven by the business cycle. Since the longer interval may capture the persistence of industry employment downturns better, we report results based on the four-year interval. Results based on the two-year interval are robust.
Specification
Our base line regression model is as follows:
(1)
The dependent variable, ijkt y , is either the logarithm of the number of employees, the logarithm of the median daily wage, or a measure of profitability or valuation, where i indexes establishments, j indexes firms, k indexes industry, and t indexes time.
jt Parity is the parity dummy, kt Shock is the shock dummy, and ijkt  is an error term. The main coefficient of interest is the slope parameter  on the interaction between Parity and Shock. It measures the differential impact industry shocks have on employment or wages between parity firms and non-parity firms. When the dependent variable is the number of employees, for example, our hypothesis predicts   0 ; that is, parity firms maintain higher levels of employment after an industry-wide shock compared to non-parity firms. 2,000 employees or more in Germany. In order to avoid Parity picking up higher-order non-linear size effects, we also include the square of the logarithms of the number of employees and sales, both at the firm level. We count the number of employees only in Germany because the requirement for parity codetermination depends on the number of employees in Germany. All variables in monetary terms (e.g., sales and wages) are adjusted for inflation and stated in 2005 Euros.
We also estimate panel regressions with firm performance measures as dependent variables. We use an accounting based measure of profitability, the return on assets, ROA, and a market value based measure of valuation, the logarithm of Tobin's Q, LogTobinsQ. In the performance regressions, we include firm fixed effects instead of establishment fixed effects and calculate all control variables at the firm level.
Empirical results
Our empirical analyses begin with an investigation of how layoffs at establishments owned by parity firms differ from those owned by non-parity firms when the industry suffers a negative shock to employment. We then conduct similar difference-in-differences analyses on wages, firm performance, systematic risk (beta), and asset sales.
Employment
We first estimate regression (1) for all employees at the establishment level. Then we separate employees by occupational status into white-collar, skilled blue-collar, and unskilled blue-collar workers, and re-estimate the regression for each type. For each of these regressions, we estimate four different specifications including different combinations of controls. All regressions include establishment fixed effects. Reported results are based on Shock as defined by the four-year interval. Results based on the two-year interval are similar. For employment regressions, we include only establishments with more than 50 employees. Inclusion of establishments with a small number of employees would increase noise and would give too much weight to small establishments; for example, for an establishment with only 10 employees, the loss of one employee accounts for 10% of the work force. Results reported under specifications (2) through (4) show that, regardless of which combination of controls is used, Shock × Parity has a positive coefficient that is economically large and statistically significant, ranging from 0.138 to 0.200. Specification (3), which includes all controls, except for higherorder terms, shows a coefficient of 0.147 on Shock × Parity. This suggests that employment in paritycodetermined firms is 14.7% greater in comparison to non-parity firms during shock periods. Note that the non-parity firms often include those with one third of the board seats occupied by worker representatives. Hence, the employment impact implied by the coefficient of Shock × Parity may be interpreted as the incremental impact of moving from non-parity codetermination to parity codetermination, not from no employee representation to parity codetermination. In our sample, the number of firm-years with no labor representation is smaller than the number of firm years with onethird codetermination. 17
The negative coefficient on Shock remains significant regardless of which combination of controls is used, with the magnitude being similar across specifications. This implies non-parity firms suffer a sharp decline in employment. We perform an F-test for the restriction that the coefficients on Shock and Shock 17 Our sample contains 265, 442, and 1461 firm-year observations with no, one-third, and one-half worker representatives, respectively.
× Parity add up to zero, which would indicate perfect insurance. In no specification can we reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on Shock and Shock × Parity have the same magnitude with opposite signs, regardless of which controls are included. In untabulated robustness checks we obtain similar results if we use the two-year definition of shocks. It appears employees working for parity firms are more or less fully protected against negative industry shocks. An industry-wide decline in employment, on average, leads to a decline of about 15% in employment among non-parity firms, but employees of parity firms are practically immune to layoffs during shock periods. 18
This generalization may not apply to all employees, however. If employees are protected from layoffs because the 50% employee representation on the supervisory board helps enforce implicit insurance, the enforcement may vary depending on how closely the employees are aligned with employee representatives. For example, if worker representatives are mostly drawn from the pool of skilled blue-collar workers and/or white-collar workers, the representatives may focus their efforts on protecting their own kind, namely, fellow skilled blue-collar and/or white-collar workers, rather than unskilled, less educated workers who may have less influence on who gets elected to the board.
Moreover, if an important purpose of providing the insurance is to encourage employees to make investments in firm-specific human capital, insurance is more likely to be extended to skilled and better educated employees than to unskilled, less educated workers who can be more easily replaced and whose investment in firm-specific human capital may be worth less. To investigate this potential heterogeneity across different types of employees, we re-estimate regression (1) separately for three types of employees: White-collar employees, skilled blue-collar workers, and unskilled blue-collar workers. This classification is made based on IAB's classification of workers' occupational status described in Section 3.2.
18
The results get somewhat weaker for the shorter-term definition of shocks and if we use higher order controls. Note that in these cases the magnitude and precision of Shock goes down as well, suggesting that the definition of Shock is noisier and that some of the controls pick up some of the variation in Shock. Table 6 re-estimates the same four specifications for white-collar employees. The overall results are qualitatively the same as those for all employees in Table 5 . The only exception is specification (2), which rejects that Shock + Shock × Parity = 0 in favor of a positive net effect. Table 7 repeats the same exercise for skilled blue-collar workers. The results are again similar to those in Table 5 . F-statistics do not reject Shock + Shock × Parity=0, except specification (3), which is significant at the 5% level in favor of a positive net effect. White-collar and skilled blue-collar employees seem to be fully protected against industrywide declines in employment if firms have 50% worker representation on the supervisory board.
This generalization does not apply to workers who are less skilled and less educated. Table 8 reestimates the same specifications again for unskilled blue-collar workers, yielding no evidence of insurance against negative industry shocks. None of the four specifications yields a significant coefficient on Shock × Parity; furthermore, the coefficient is negative, albeit insignificant, in all specifications. Unlike white-collar and skilled blue-collar workers, there is no evidence these workers are protected against an industry-wide decline in employment. The impact of Shock is still mostly significant, although the economic magnitude is somewhat smaller and statistical significance is lower than for white-collar and skilled blue-collar workers. Finally, the coefficient on Parity codetermination is negative but mostly insignificant, except for the unskilled blue-collar worker subsample, where it is marginally significant in the specification without controls.
These subsample analyses yield an interesting new insight. Parity codetermination provides protection against industry-wide declines in employment only for better educated and skilled workers.
There is no evidence the same insurance extends to less educated, less skilled workers. There are two potential explanations for the difference. Employee representatives on boards are either union leaders or elected from the firm's employees. Both groups are more likely to come from skilled blue-collar workers and/or white-collar workers, whose interests may therefore be better represented than those of unskilled workers. Alternatively, insuring skilled blue-collar workers and white-collar workers against layoffs may be motivated by encouraging investments in firm-specific human capital, enhancing productivity. Unskilled workers are more easily replaceable and probably have less human capital to invest for firm specific purposes, which makes insuring them less important from the perspective of the firm.
Wages
The protection against layoffs during an industry-wide decline in employment among parity firms may not be the results of implementing implicit insurance contracts. It may simply due to the influence employee representatives have in reducing or blocking layoffs when they make up 50% of supervisory boards. To distinguish the insurance hypothesis from the entrenchment hypothesis, we examine the relation between wages and parity codetermination. According to the insurance hypothesis, workers receive lower wages in return for job security, i.e., pay an insurance premium. By contrast, if parity firms provide job security without wage concessions, then the protection against adverse industry shocks may be attributed to the power bestowed onto employees by mandatory codetermination.
To distinguish these two hypotheses, we first estimate regressions relating wages to the Parity indicator. In these regressions we measure the differences in wages between parity-codetermined firms and all other firms. We then estimate the difference-in-differences by adding Shock and Shock x Parity to the regression.
We use the median wage at each establishment because the IAB only provides the first quartile, the median, and the third quartile wages. We use two sets of control variables (1) the control variables used in the employment regressions (see model 4 of Tables 5 to 8), (2) these variables plus the number of employees in the establishment, the median employee age, and the percentage of white collar employees. These controls are added for the wage regression because prior research suggests they are important in explaining average employee wages (e.g., Oi and Idson, 1999; Brown and Medoff, 1989) .
We take logs of all level variables when estimating regressions.
In the wage regressions we use IAB's breakdown of employees according to their educational and vocational qualifications. Thus, we classify employees as: (1) accordingly, there are fewer observations for those categories in our regressions. We refer to Section 3.2 for the precise definitions of qualification levels and a discussion of the availability of these data. The classification of employees by occupational status used for employment regressions is different from the classification by qualification used in the wage regressions and we cannot match one to the other. Nonetheless, those classified as qualified or highly qualified are most likely skilled blue-and whitecollar employees, and are highly unlikely to be classified as unskilled blue-collar workers in the employment data. Thus, the wage results, together with the employment results, suggest that skilled blue-and white-collar employees receive insurance and pay approximately 3% of their wages as a premium. The combined results also imply unskilled blue-collar workers do not receive protection against layoffs during an industry downturn and do not pay an insurance premium. The results for lowqualified employees are somewhat ambiguous. The point estimates for Parity for low-qualified employees are very similar to those for other qualification levels, but they are not statistically significant.
An alternative interpretation is that all employees pay an insurance premium of about 3% in parity firms but only low-qualified employees do not profit from the insurance. The reason for this evident discrimination might be their under representation on the board as discussed above.
Estimated coefficients on controls are consistent with intuition. Unsurprisingly, older employees get paid more. Older and larger firms (measured by sales) also tend to pay higher wages, but larger establishments (measured by number of employees) tend to pay lower wages. The last result is somewhat surprising given the literature on the employer-size-wage effect (e.g., Brown and Medoff, 1989 ). However, our sample is considerably skewed towards large firms and we use a number of other firm size controls at the same time. Both facts could explain why we find a negative effect of establishment size on wages.
Earlier regression estimates imply employees of parity firms' are protected from layoffs during industry shocks. Are they also protected against cuts in wages? To answer this question, we estimate the difference-in-differences in wages by adding Shock and Shock × Parity to the regressions in Table 9 . term shows positive coefficients in all specifications but is only marginally significant at the 10%-level in one specification (4) The F-tests on Shock + Shock × Parity = 0 can never be rejected (untabulated). It appears that employees of parity firms do not get additional insurance against wage cuts. However, the mostly insignificant results on Shock imply that all firms in Germany, parity-codetermined and not paritycodetermined, rarely react with significant wage cuts after adverse industry shocks. A potential explanation for this finding might be the prevalence of industry-wide collective bargaining agreements, which make wages in Germany very downward rigid. Levine and Tyson's (1990) argument in favor of mandatory worker representation on boards critically hinges on the externality firms face with voluntary worker representation. The externality is caused by the compressed wage structure they conjecture will arise with labor representation; namely, smaller gaps in wages between highly and lower paid workers. To test their hypothesis (Hypothesis 4), we calculate the difference between the third and first quartile of the gross average daily wage of all full-time employees at each establishment and scale it by the median wage. Table 10 relates Parity to this scaled interquartile range of wages. The set of control variables is the same as in Table 9 .
The coefficient of Parity is negative and marginally significant for all employees if we do not control for additional establishment characteristics (Model 1). However, the economic significance is rather small. The interquartile range is only compressed by 1.4%. We repeat the estimation for the three different employee groups separated by their qualification levels and find insignificant negative results for low-qualified and qualified employees and insignificant positive results for highly qualified employees. Although it is possible our estimation is too crude to identify wage compression, the insufficient evidence casts doubt on the empirical validity of the key assumption underlying the proregulation argument.
Performance regressions
Our final analyses are focused on firm profitability and valuation, systematic risk, and major asset sales.
The purposes are two-fold. First, we test the prediction that the insurance provided by paritycodetermined firms leads to a higher operating leverage, exposing them to larger reductions in profitability and valuation from an industry shock relative to non-parity firms (Hypothesis 2). Second, we test the worker-management entrenchment hypothesis against the hypothesis that mandated codetermination is efficient. The former predicts parity firms are less profitable and valued lower relative to non-parity firms, whereas the latter predicts the opposite.
All predictions related to firm performance are made at the firm level. We therefore redefine our shock measure as FirmShock, the proportion of a firm's employees working in establishments in industries for which Shock = 1. FirmShock is a weighted average of Shock in a given firm-year, ranging between 0 and 1. For example, if 60% of a firm's employees work in industries in which Shock equals 1, and the remaining 40% work in industries not subject to a shock in that year, then FirmShock equals 0.6.
We use ROA and Tobin's Q as our measures of profitability and firm valuation. We estimate differencein-differences analysis with ROA and the logarithm of Tobin's Q as dependent variables.
To estimate the effect of insurance on operating leverage, our main interest is again in the coefficient of FirmShock × Parity. We expect it to be negative. Table 11 reports the results; columns (1) and (2) for ROA and columns (3) and (4) Table 2 ). The decline in Tobin's Q ranges from 9.2% to 12.9% if all employees are affected by a shock. The evidence supports our hypothesis that adverse industry shocks affect parity-codetermined firms' performance much more negatively than non-parity firms.
This evidence of higher operating leverage suggests that parity-codetermined firms have higher systematic risk. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 11 investigate the relation by estimating difference-indifferences for beta. Beta is estimated using the market model and daily stock returns for each calendar
year. The coefficient on Parity has the predicted positive sign but is insignificant, while the coefficient on FirmShock × Parity is positive and significant, implying that the parity-codetermined firm's beta increases markedly during adverse industry shocks.
One way to finance the maintenance of payroll during negative shock periods is to sell assets (Atanassov and Kim, 2009 ). Thus, we expect parity-codetermined firms to undertake more asset sales to protect their core employees during adverse industry shock periods. To test this prediction, we define a dummy variable, Net PPE dummy, which equals one if net PPE declines by more than 15%, and zero otherwise. We estimate the PPE regressions as linear probability models even though the dependent variable is a dummy variable, because Probit estimates may not be reliable if many explanatory variables are dummies. However, when we re-estimate the regressions using Probit we find qualitatively similar results.
The results are reported in columns (7) and (8) of Table 11 . The coefficient on FirmShock × Parity is positive, indicating that parity-codetermined firms undertake more asset sales during shock periods than non-parity firms. The coefficient on Parity is also positive, revealing the tendency of parity-codetermined firms to undertake more asset sales even outside shock periods. However, the coefficient on FirmShock × Parity is much larger and indicates that some of the insurance provided to workers is paid for by additional asset sales.
The performance estimates in Table 11 also help examine whether parity firms perform better or worse than non-parity firm. Based on the skeptical stance expressed by Jensen and Meckling (1979) and
by the proponents of the entrenchment hypothesis, the coefficient on Parity should be negative in both regressions, because this coefficient measures the impact of parity codetermination on profitability and firm value after controlling for the shock and for the interaction effect of the shock with Parity. By contrast, the optimistic arguments of Levine and Tyson (1990) and others lead to the opposite prediction. The results are inconclusive. The coefficient on Parity in for the regression of Tobin's Q is numerically positive, whereas that in the ROA regression is negative; the estimates are never statistically significant for either dependent variable. In view of the strong evidence that suggests higher operating leverage and higher costs during shocks, we therefore conclude that the benefits of codetermination to shareholders just about outweigh the costs. 19
Conclusions and implications
We find parity-codetermined firms provide employees greater protection against layoffs during adverse industry shocks. Employment protection leads parity firms to suffer bigger declines in firm profitability and valuation and exhibit higher beta during the shock periods than non-parity firms. Parity firms also engage in more major asset sales during shock periods, presumably to maintain the payroll. These phenomena are consistent with both the insurance and the worker-management entrenchment hypothesis. According to the insurance hypothesis, parity codetermination serves as an ex-post enforcement mechanism to ensure firms honor implicit insurance contracts, whereby workers receive 19 Renaud (2007) surveys four studies that use either Tobin's Q or the market-to-book ratio, with two studies finding negative effects and the other two finding no effect of worker representation.
protection against adverse shocks in return for accepting lower wages. The entrenchment hypothesis, by contrast, suggests the stronger worker influence stemming from parity codetermination leads to workermanagement alliance that may harm shareholders. Both hypotheses predict workers employed by parity firms receive protection against adverse shocks.
What distinguishes the two hypotheses is the wage differential between parity and non-parity firms.
If the employment protection represents the payoff from the insurance contracts, we expect employees of parity firms to receive lower wages than those working for non-parity firms. This is what we observe:
skilled blue-collar and white-collar workers pay an insurance premium of about 3% of their wages in return for higher job security. Thus, much of the employment protection seems to be the results of an implicit insurance contract between parity firms and their employees.
We cannot establish directly whether the insurance premium paid by workers is adequate or not and whether parity firms benefit from providing insurance to a significant proportion of their workers.
We investigate if parity-codetermined firms are more profitable or more valuable relative to other firms.
We find that parity firms perform similarly to non-parity firms and conclude that any net gains from providing insurance are appropriated by workers. This table presents results for OLS regressions with the scaled interquartile range of wages as dependent variable. It is defined as the difference of the 3 rd and 1 st quartile scaled by the median of gross average daily wage for (1) all full-time employees, (2) without educational/vocational qualifications, (3) with educational/vocational qualifications, (4) with higher educational qualifications. Only establishments with more than 50 employees are included in the regression sample. All regressions contain year and establishment fixed effects. The t-statistics for the coefficient estimates are reported in parentheses below the estimates. Standard errors allow for clustering at the firm level.
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